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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a premises liability case. The issue is whether Respondents (collectively "Wal-Mart") can
be held liable for injuries that Appellant Michael Johnson sustained as a result of a slip and fall on liquid
in the housewares department at Wal-Mart Store 2508 on June 30, 2015. Under well-established Idaho
law, Wal-Mart cannot be held liable absent notice of a dangerous condition. The record contains no
evidence of actual notice. As a result, Mr. Johnson points to Wal-Mart's policies and procedures to try to
establish constructive notice. However, the policies and procedures establish only that Wal-Mart knew
that spills can occur. Knowledge that a spill can occur is not knowledge that a spill has occurred or is

likely to occur in a particular area and therefore does not support a finding of constructive notice. If a
possibility of a spill occurring were sufficient basis to impose a duty of care, retail stores would become
insurers of customer safety, and the legal standard would convert to strict liability. The law is clear that
retail stores are not insurers and are not strictly liable. Because Wal-Mart is not an insurer of safety and
because Wal-Mart had no notice of liquid on the floor, Wal-Mart had no duty to Mr. Johnson and cannot
be held liable for damages.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Wal-Mart filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss
Mr. Johnson's claim for lack of evidence that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of the liquid on
the floor. R. 000019-34. Mr. Johnson opposed the motion, arguing that Wal-Mart had constructive
notice of a spill hazard, an allegedly recurring condition, because it trained employees of a risk and
because it had a permissive policy of allowing customers to bring liquid into the store. R. 000084-86; Tr.
19:23

20:13, 21:6-19.
The district court granted Wal-Mart's motion, finding no evidence that the liquid on the floor was

a recurring condition and finding no basis to impute knowledge of the liquid on the floor to Wal-Mart.
R. 000190-192. In its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
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Judgment, the district court explained, "the reality that people sometimes slip on spilled liquid ... isn't
reason enough to deem the spill on which Johnson slipped a recurring or continuing condition."
R. 000190. As to the specific liquid on the floor, the district court applied the scintilla test and found that
to impute knowledge, "something more" was needed than the mere presence of liquid on the floor.
R. 000192. It then found the "something more" to be lacking, concluding that there needed to be some

evidence as to how long the liquid had been on the floor. R. 000192. Additionally, the district court
declined to "impute knowledge of the spill to Walmart simply because it lets customers carry beverages
about the store." R. 000191.
Mr. Johnson timely appealed. R. 000196.

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Johnson Slipped and Fell on a Liquid Substance in Wal-Mart's Overland Store.
On June 30, 2015, in the middle of the afternoon on a warm sunny day, Mr. Johnson and his

girlfriend went to the Overland store to buy motorcycle straps. R. 000037 (, 2), 000042 (95:21-24),
000044 (99: 18-24). Mr. Johnson and his girlfriend entered the Overland store on the grocery side and
made their way over to the general merchandise side. R. 000037 (, 2), 000043-47 (96:21-23, 99:9-10,
100:2-6, 101:23 -102:6); R. 000071 (,12), 000074. While walking through the housewares department,
in an aisle with trash cans on the shelves, Mr. Johnson slipped on a liquid substance and fell. R. 000037
(, 2), 000047 (102:7-16), 000054 (114:13-18).
The only eyewitness to the fall was Mr. Johnson's girlfriend. See R. 000037 (, 2), 000047-48
(102:17 - 103:7). There were no employees in the aisle at the time of the fall. See id. Also, Wal-Mart
does not have surveillance video of the incident because the Overland store did not have a camera taking
surveillance video of the aisle in the housewares department where Mr. Johnson fell. R. 000067 (, 12).
There was a camera taking surveillance video of an "action alley" (i.e., a main aisle) perpendicular to the
aisle where Mr. Johnson fell. R. 000066 (, 10). Video from that camera shows Mr. Johnson enter the
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action alley on the ground at approximately 3: 13 p.m. R. 000066

(ilil 10-11 ); R. 000063.

In other words,

it shows him after he has fallen on the floor.

B.

The Source of the Liquid and How Long It Was on the Floor Are Unknown.
Mr. Johnson does not know what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it

had been on the floor. R. 000037

(il 2), 000049-51

(104:19-22, 108:13 -109:4-16). Likewise,

Mr. Johnson's girlfriend does not know what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it
had been on the floor. R. 000037

(il 4), 000060 (34:3-8).

Finally, Mr. Johnson did not come forward

with evidence that Wal-Mart knew what the liquid substance was, where it came from, or how long it had
been on the floor of the Overland store.
The surveillance video of the action alley perpendicular to where Mr. Johnson fell shows
approximately 14 customers, some with shopping carts, either enter or exit the housewares department
aisle from the action alley in the 30 minutes before Mr. Johnson's fall. R. 000066 (il 11); R. 000037

(ilil 5-6), R.
(il 12), R.

000063. The video does not show activity in the aisle where Mr. Johnson fell. See R. 000067

000063. Also, it does not show how or when the liquid ended up on the floor. See R. 000067

(il 12), R. 000063.
C.

Wal-Mart's Overland Store Does Not Have a History of Liquid on the Floor or
Other Incidents in the Area Where Mr. Johnson Fell.
The Overland store does not have a record of anyone reporting liquid on the floor in the aisle

where Mr. Johnson fell prior to the slip and fall on June 30, 2015. R. 000071(,r 8). Additionally, the
Overland store does not have record of liquid previously being on the floor in this aisle at any time.
R. 000071 ,r,r 9-10. Finally, there is no record of other accidents, including slip and falls, reportedly
taking place in this aisle before Mr. Johnson's slip and fall on June 30, 2015. R. 000071

(il 7).

In other

words, Mr. Johnson's fall in this area was the first of its kind.
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D.

Wal-Mart Has Procedures in Place to Keep Store Premises Reasonably Free from
Possible Spills.
Wal-Mart recognizes that spills can cause accidents and has implemented procedures to reduce

the possibility of accidents from spills. See ROOO 116-17 (30:24 - 32:4); R. 000166. One procedure is
called "Spill Cleanup Procedure." See R000166-l 74. This procedure encourages employees to place "a
strong emphasis on prompt cleanup of spills." See ROOO 166. It also identifies specific actions associates
should take to promptly cleanup spills. See R000167-l 74. Nothing in the procedure identifies how often
spills or accidents occur.
In order to keep the floors reasonably free from spills, Wal-Mart has a culture in which associates
keep a constant look-out for spills and promptly clean-up spills. R. 000116-17 (30:24- 31 :22). WalMart also employs associates to focus on maintaining the floors in the action alleys (high-traffic aisles)
•

durmgpeakhours. R. 000117-18 (33:3-15, 36:15-25, 38:1-39:11).

IV.

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart.
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard as the
district court. Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 543, 328 P.3d 520, 524 (2014). Summary
judgment is proper under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) if the moving party shows that
there is an absence of material facts with respect to a claim and the nonmoving party fails to
show specific facts that would support the claim at trial. Id. The nonmoving party must "make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which

1

Mr. Johnson represents that certain associates have the job of walking the action alleys solely to
look for spills. Appellant's Brief at 15. That is not accurate. The job is broader than looking for spills, it
is to maintain the floors. R. 000117-18 (33 :3-15, 36: 15-25, 38: 1 - 39: 11 ).
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho
527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323
(1986); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). "[A] mere scintilla of
evidence or merely casting a slight doubt over the facts will not defeat summary judgment."
Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 593, 272 P.3d 562, 565 (2012). "[T]here must be evidence upon
which a jury may rely." Id.
VI.

ARGUMENT

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondents.
Mr. Johnson did not present admissible evidence to support a finding that Wal-Mart had notice
of a dangerous condition. In the absence of notice, Wal-Mart did not breach a duty owed to
Mr. Johnson. The law does not impose a duty on Wal-Mart to keep liquids out of the store or to
give a general warning of a possibility of liquid on the floor. Additionally, the law has never
required retail stores to be held strictly liable for accidents on the premises.
A.

Wal-Mart Did Not Have Constructive Notice of a Dangerous Condition Giving Rise
to a Duty.

For the purpose of a premises liability claim, an injured invitee must prove: "(1) a duty,
recognized by law, requiring a [retail store] to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting
2

injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. There are
two kinds of duties a retail store may owe to an invitee: (a) a duty "to warn of any concealed
dangers which the landowner knows of or should have known of upon reasonable investigation

2

The parties agree that Mr. Johnson was an invitee of Wal-Mart.
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of the land," and (b) a duty "to keep the premises reasonably safe," i.e., free from dangerous
conditions. Stem, 152 Idaho at 594, 272 P .3d at 566. The duty owed by a retail store is one of
ordinary care, not a heightened or special duty. Tommerup v. Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3,
607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,
768 P.2d 1321 (1989). "The owner of the business is not an insurer against injury of its
customers." Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 445, 337 P.3d 602, 604 (2014)
(emphasis added).
To prove the existence of a duty, an invitee must "show that the landowner knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the alleged dangerous condition," i.e.,
"actual or constructive notice." Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. This is true regardless.
of whether the dangerous condition is an isolated incident or a recurring condition actively
created by an operating method. Id. at 548-49, 328 P.3d at 528-29.
Evidence sufficient to support a finding of notice is different for a case involving an
isolated incident than for a case involving a recurring or continuous condition actively created by
an operating method. In an isolated incident case, there must be actual or constructive notice of
the "specific condition" causing the alleged injury. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. In
a recurring condition case, there must be actual or constructive notice that "operating methods
caused or were likely to cause a dangerous condition." Id. Under either theory, proof of notice
is never excused because it is notice, combined with a failure to act, that leads to negligence.
In this case, Mr. Johnson argues that Wal-Mart's business practices created a recurring or
continuous risk of liquid on the floor. The district court correctly found that this is an isolated
incident case for which Mr. Johnson has no evidence of notice of the specific liquid.
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1.

There is no evidence of a recurring or continuous condition where
Mr. Johnson fell, let alone that Wal-Mart knew or should have known of
such a condition.

An operating method does not provide a potential basis for liability unless there is
evidence that a landowner has a habit of actively creating a foreseeably unsafe condition or
allowing an unsafe condition to continuously develop or exist over a period of time. See Shea,
156 Idaho at 549-51, 328 P.3d at 529-31; Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677-78, 273
P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (2012); All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479,481, 708 P.2d 884,886
(1985); McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 308, 707 P.2d 416, 419 (1985); Mann
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974). In these cases, the dangerous
condition is not a singular and unexpected event. Rather, it is something that is recurring or
continuous or is reasonably likely to be recurring over a period of time.
For example, in Shea, there was evidence that a car wash operator's method of business
resulted in ice generally forming on cold days when vehicles track water out of the car wash.
156 Idaho at 550-51, 328 P Jd at 530-31. Additionally, there was evidence that the car wash
operator had "knowledge of the 'continuous formation' of ice buildup at the car wash exit at
certain times during the winter months." Id. at 551,328 P.3d at 531 (emphasis added). This
evidence was found sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement in a negligent action. Id.
Thus, the invitee who slipped on ice at the car wash exit was allowed to proceed with a premises
liability claim. Id.
In Ball, there was evidence that the City of Blackfoot had a "habit of plowing parking lot
snow onto the grass beside the sidewalk" in a municipal swimming pool parking lot. Id. at 678,
273 P.3d at 1271 (emphasis added). This operating method "caused excess snow melt to run
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onto the sidewalk where it subsequently froze, creating especially icy sidewalk conditions." Id.
A patron advised the pool manager of the icy conditions but did not see subsequent application
of ice melt before a slip and fall by another patron. Id. This Court found the evidence sufficient
to create an issue of fact as to whether the city breached a duty to maintain the sidewalk in a
reasonably safe condition. Id. at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270.
In All, there was evidence that a parking lot owner's operating methods had allowed
"continuous formation" of potholes. 109 Idaho at 482, 708 P .2d at 887 (emphasis added).

There was also evidence that the parking lot owner was aware of the deteriorating condition of
the parking lot and had been filling in holes with gravel until the lot could be repaved. Id. at 480,
708 P.2d at 885. Because the potholes had formed over a period of time, this Court found the
evidence sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for directed verdict, concluding that the
invitee did not need to prove constructive knowledge of the specific pothole causing the fall. Id.
at 482, 708 P.2d at 887.
In McDonald, there was evidence that a store handed out ice cream cones to customers,
including children and infants, on a busy day with abnormally large crowds. 109 Idaho at 307,
707 P.2d at 418. Ice cream ended up on the floor, and after it had melted, an invitee slipped and
fell. Id. at 306, 707 P.2d at 417. This Court concluded the melted ice cream was not an isolated
incident but was instead a foreseeable risk of harm "actively created'' in the store's course of
business of handing out ice cream cones to kids, who consumed them there on the premises. Id.
at 308, 707 P.2d at 419 (emphasis added). Additionally, because there was evidence that it takes
"an hour or two" for ice cream to fully melt, thereby indicating that the melted ice cream had
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been on the floor for a substantial period of time, this Court concluded that a jury could find that
the store had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Id. at 310, 707 P.2d at 421.
In reaching its decision in McDonald, this Court looked to a case from Colorado for
guidance, Jasko v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 494 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1972). The Colorado Supreme
Court concluded that pizza on the ground was not an isolated incident where the food came from
a company's method of selling individual slices of pizza, delivered on wax paper, for customers
to consume immediately while standing. Jasko, 494 P.2d at 840. The practice of distributing
food in that manner was held to create a "reasonable probability" that food would drop to the
floor, as further evidenced by porters "constantly" sweeping up debris from the floor. Id.
(emphasis added). Just as pizza being sold for immediate consumption actively created a risk of
food on the ground, so too ice cream being handed out for immediate consumption actively
created a risk of food on the ground, on a likely recurring basis. McDonald, l 09 Idaho at 308,
707 P.2d at 419.
This case is distinguishable from each of the above cases. First, there is no evidence of
an operating method causing a continuous formation of liquid on t~e floor. Second, there is no
evidence of an operating method causing a recurring or likely to be a recurring condition of
liquid on the floor in the area where Mr. Johnson fell.
Mr. Johnson first argues that this is an operating methods case because of language in
Wal-Mart's "Spill Cleanup Procedure." The language he relies upon states a simple fact: "Spills
are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the store." See ROOOl 66. Contrary to
Mr. Johnson's assertions, the language does not state that spills are a big problem, and it does not
constitute a warning to employees of a problem. Additionally, nothing in this statement

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 9
44892.0013.10620591.1

establishes a recurring or continuous problem of liquid in the housewares department or in the
store as a whole, let alone an operating method causing a recurring or continuous problem. The
procedure simply trains employees to promptly clean-up spills if they occur. This training is
evidence of Wal-Mart's compliance with the standard of care, not a breach of the standard of
care.
Next, Mr. Johnson argues that this is an operating methods case because Wal-Mart has a
business practice of allowing customers to bring personal liquids into the store from the outside.
However, there is no evidence that this permissive policy caused the specific liquid to be on the
floor let alone a recurring incident of liquid on the floor. The source of the liquid is unknown.
Assuming arguendo that the liquid could be traced to a customer who brought it into the store,
such a fact would not put this case into the operating method cases. Unlike McDonald and
Jasko, Wal-Mart was not actively creating a foreseeable hazard by handing out liquid or food in
open containers. Unlike Shea and Ball, Wal-Mart did not have an operating method that caused
the build-up ofliquid on the floor in the housewares department. Unlike All, Wal-Mart did not
allow a condition to develop in the store over a period of time.
There simply is no admissible record evidence to support a finding that there was a
recurring or continual problem of liquid on the floor created by an operating method. Nor is
there evidence to establish that Wal-Mart's operations caused or otherwise resulted in liquid on
the floor. Rather, the uncontested evidence in the record shows that Mr. Johnson fell in a drygoods houseware aisle where Wal-Mart had no history of other incidents of liquid on the floor.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's finding that this case involves an
isolated incident, not a recurring or continuous condition caused by an operating method.
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2.

There is no evidence that Wal-Mart knew or had reason to know of the
specific condition of the floor where Mr. Johnson fell.

In an isolated incident case, an injured invitee bears the burden of proving actual or
constructive notice of the specific condition causing injury. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at
528. To prove constructive notice, there must be evidence establishing a reason that a retail store
should have known about the specific dangerous condition. See Antim v. Fred Meyers Stores,
Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 781, 251 P.3d 602, 609 (Ct. App. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for

defendant because the plaintiffs contention as to how long the mat had been folded was "based
on pure speculation"); Hansen v. City of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 704, 184 P.3d 206,210
(2008) (affirming summary judgment for defendant where the plaintiff could not "point to any
evidence indicating that one explanation is more plausible than the other" or "remov[ing] this
issue from the realm of speculation" as to when a water meter lid became askew); Giles v.
Montgomery Ward, Co., 94 Idaho 484,485,491 P.2d 1256, 1257 (1971) (finding insufficient

evidence to establish negligence based on a suggestion that a floor was slippery).
Mr. Johnson presented no record admissible evidence to the Court as to what the liquid
substance was, where the liquid came from, or how long it had been on the floor. Although
Mr. Johnson mentions numerous possibilities as to the source of the liquid, he identifies no
possibility that is beyond the realm of speculation.
The possibility of a liquid from an unknown source being spilled on the floor of an aisle
in the housewares department at some unknown time is not evidence that Wal-Mart had reason
to know of the specific liquid on the floor when Mr. Johnson fell. Although there may have been
Wal-Mart associates in nearby aisles, there is no evidence that the associates had time or reason
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to discover the liquid on the floor. Moreover, these witnesses' testimony is not before this Court,
which only leads to further speculation.
In the absence of evidence as to the liquid's source and the duration of time that it was on
the floor, there is no basis to impute knowledge of the liquid to Wal-Mart, leaving Mr. Johnson
without evidence to support his claim for relief. Accordingly, Wal-Mart asks this Court to affirm
the district court's decision, granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment.
B.

Wal-Mart Did Not Fail to Exercise Reasonable Care for Safety.
Mr. Johnson claims that Wal-Mart breached a duty to reasonably maintain the premises

by allowing liquids in the store and by not giving a general warning of a possibility of liquid on
the floor. These claims are not supported by law or fact.
1.

There is no evidence that Wal-Mart breached a duty of care by allowing
customers to bring liquids on the premises.

A business policy allowing customers to bring something on the property only gives rise
to liability if it creates an "unreasonable risk of harm." Braese, 157 Idaho at 445, 337 P.3d at
604. In Braese, a policy by Stinker Stores allowing customers to bring dogs into its Hyde Park
store was not a basis for liability because there was no evidence that the policy created an
unreasonable risk of harm. Id. The policy was challenged when a patron was hit in the chest by
the paws of a dog belonging to another patron. Id. The patron filed a common law negligence
claim against Stinker Stores, but the district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment. Id.
This Court affirmed the dismissal, noting that there had only been one other incident with a dog
in 15 years, and it was not a similar incident. Id. Additionally, the evidence showed that
although the store had millions of customers, it made an effort to keep uncontrollable dogs out of
the store. Id. There was no evidence that the dog at issue was uncontrollable. Id.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 12
44892.0013.10620591. l

Here, there is no record evidence that Wal-Mart created an unreasonable risk of harm by
allowing customers to bring liquids into the store. There is no evidence as to how many
customers actually bring liquids in the store. Nor is there evidence as to whether customers spill
liquids that they bring in from outside. In the absence of such evidence, Mr. Johnson cannot
establish a likelihood of liquid on the floor from a liquid that is brought into the store by
customers.
Additionally, there is no evidence linking the liquid on the floor to Wal-Mart's
permissive policy of allowing customers to bring liquids in the store. The source of the liquid
that caused Mr. Johnson's fall is unknown. Mr. Johnson is merely speculating as to a possible
source of liquid.
Because Mr. Johnson cannot establish that Wal-Mart's policy created an unreasonable
risk or resulted in liquid on which he slipped, Wal-Mart's policy does not provide a basis for a
premises liability claim.

2.

There is no rule of law requiring Wal-Mart to give a general warning, nonspecific to an existing dangerous condition.

Nothing in the law requires a retail store to warn of a possibility of liquid on the floor.
Rather, a duty to warn arises where there is actual or constructive notice of liquid on the floor.

Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. Because there is no admissible record evidence that
Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, as explained above in
section VI.A, Wal-Mart did not have a duty to warn.
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C.

Wal-Mart Is Not Strictly Liable for Injuries that Occur on Its Premises.
Mr. Johnson is in essence asking this Court to find that Wal-Mart can be held liable based

on a possibility, not a probability, ofliquid on the floor of the houseware department. Such a
holding would result in strict liability.
A retailer is not an insurer of safety and is not strictly liable simply because there is a
possibility a dangerous condition may appear on the store premises. See Tommerup v.
Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3,607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980),.overruled on other grounds by
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P .2d 1321 (1989). Additionally, a retailer is not required
to have knowledge of all possible dangerous conditions. See Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 594,
272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012) (finding no evidence that a landlord should have known a water meter
cover could be dangerous where the landlord did not have "any knowledge of the weight bearing
capacity of the water meter covers, or any training or experience that would give him such
knowledge"). "The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the
perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to [a] person going upon the property."
,Tommerup, 101 Idaho at 3-4, 607 P.2d at 1057-58 (quoting Martin v. Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 382,
54 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1936)) (emphasis added).
As explained above, Mr. Johnson bears the burden of proving notice of an actual
dangerous condition, not a possibility of a dangerous condition. In the absence of such evidence,
Mr. Johnson does not have a claim for relief against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is not strictly liable
for Mr. Johnson's alleged injuries.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart be affirmed.
DATED THIS

9th

day of March, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
/

By~---'--~~~~~~~~~~~~
Iler, ISB No. 7983
Mindy
Attorneys
Wal-Mart Defendants/Respondents

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 15
44892.0013 .10620591.l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of March, 2018, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed
to each of the following:
Eric B. Swartz
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
623 W. Hays St.
Boise, ID 83 702

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-Mail eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
D Facsimile: 208.489.8988

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 16
44892.0013.10620591.l

